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APPELLATE REVIEW OF PRIMARY SENTENCING DECISIONS:
A CONNECTICUT CASE STUDY*
TRIBUNALS empowered to review criminal sentences imposed by trial judges
and other primary sentencing authorities I can contribute significantly to the
improved use of criminal sanctions. Review affords a second look at the sentence
in light of the societal aims which such sanctions should achieve. Mure im-
portant, the body of decisions made by the reviewing tribunal may provide
meaningful criteria for the guidance of sentencing authorities. Although in
thirty-nine states and the federal courts no sentence within the statutory limits 2
for a proven offense may be modified by a higher court,3 eleven states now
have some system of appellate review. Of these eleven, nine vest the power
to affirm or reduce sentence in their existing appellate courts.
4 MassachusettsN
-The Yale Law Journal wishes to express its appreciation to Chief Judge Howard W.
Alcorn of the Connecticut Superior Court, who generously permitted the Lav Journal
to use the facilities of the Connecticut Sentence Review Division for this study; Robert
C. Zampano, Esq., the executive secretary of the Review Division; members of the Con-
necticut bench and bar; and other observers of the criminal process for their valuable
criticism. Because interviews were conducted under an assurance of anonymity, informa-
tion thus obtained is indicated by an asterisk (*) in the text. Unpublished decisions
of the Sentence Review Division are cited herein as Conn. S.R.D. Unless otherwise
indicated, the sentence of the trial court was affirmed.
1. There are three primary sentencing authorities active in American jurisdictions:
the trial judge, the jury, or an administrative board. For a list of sentencing authorities
by jurisidiction, see Tappan, Sentencing under the Miodel Penal Code, 23 Lw & Con;zm.
PRoB. 528, 532 (1958).
2. For the procedure followed by appellate courts in correcting sentences which ex-
ceed the statutory limits for the offense, see Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on
Appeal: I, 37 COLUm. L. Rnv. 521, 525-28 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Hall].
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1958) ; Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) : United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 5S3 (2d Cir. 1952). For the earlier federal rule, see Act
of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354; United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D.
'Mo. 1882). Appellate review of criminal sentences in the federal courts has been proposed
in Congress, see H.R. 270, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), but the Judicial Conference
of the United States declined to recommend its adoption. See Hearings Before Suh-
committee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14.
at 40 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
The state rule is typified by Wilson v. State, 268 Ala. 86, 105 So. 2d 66 (1958). See,
e.g., People v. Odle, 37 Cal. 2d 52, 230 P.2d 345 (1951) ; People v. Losinger, 331 .Mich.
490, 50 N.W.2d 137 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 911 (1952); Hutley v. Florida, 94
So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1957). A few state courts have indicated uncertainty as to their power
to reviewi See State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 120, 253 Pac. 14, 16 (1927) : State v
Goodall, 221 S.C. 175, 179, 69 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
4. N.Y. CoDE Cam . Paoc. § 543-1 (appellate division), § 764 (county court). The
New York Court of Appeals is without power to reduce sentence. People v. Speiser, .77
N.Y. 342, 14 N.E2d 380 (1938). NEB. Rm. STAT. § 29-2303 (1956), compare Barney v.
State, 49 Neb. 515, 68 NV. 636 (1896) (held unconstitutional), uith Palmer v. State, 70
Neb. 136, 97 NAV. 235 (1903) (reversing Barney) ; IowA Conz AN,. § 793.18 (1950) :
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717(B) (1956) (a direct adoption of the Monai. Cor, CRIm.
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and Connecticut " have created special tribunals outside their established ju-
dicial structures and have authorized them to affirm, reduce, or increase sen-
tences on appeal.7 This Comment will attempt to evaluate the Connecticut
experience in sentence review, discussing first the general problems of sentenc-
ing 8 and, second, the success of Connecticut's Sentence Review Division in
dealing with these problems.
THE NEED FOR SENTENCING CRITERIA
Despite the importance and complexity of its decision, the sentencing atthor-
ity ordinarily has no standards to measure the appropriateness of its disposi-
tive action. Judges seldom write opinions formalizing their sentencing decisions
and therefore usually fail to articulate the reasons for the sentences which
they impose. The absence of formalized criteria may also be the product of a
belief that the disposition of convicted offenders involves an intuitive process
not amenable to rational analysis.9 In the opinion of one judicial commen-
tator: "Our judgment.., is better than our reasons. And it is vain to attempt
to explain the exact proportions attributable to our interest in punishment,
retribution, reform, deterrence, and even vengeance." 10 Nevertheless, the
PROC. § 459(2)); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 212-14 (1955). Some state courts have inferred it
power to reduce sentence, usually from a statute that allows the court to "revere,
affirm, or modify the judgment." See Hooper v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 43, 121 Pac. 1087
(1912); State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279 (1921); Commonwealth v.
Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932), 108 U. PA. L. Rsv. 434 (1960) ; Brown
v. State, 34 Ark. 232 (1879).
5. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 278 §§ 28A-D (1956).
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-194-97 (1958), as amended, § 51-196 (Supp. 1959).
7. In addition, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for mandatory review
of sentence by the Convening Authority, 10 U.S.C. § 864, art. 64, and the Board of Review,
10 U.S.C. § 866, art. 66(c). United States v. Landford, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 20 C.M.R.
87 (1955). The United States Court of Military Appeals is without power to modify
a sentence that is within statutory limits. United States v. Keith, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 442,
4 C.M.R. 34 (1952).
Since 1907, the English Court of Criminal Appeal has been empowered to reduce,
increase, or change the type of punishment imposed. Act To Establish a Court of Crim-
minal Appeal, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 3(c) ; see Vanderbilt, Work of England's Courl ol
Criminal Appeal, 12 WASH. L. REV. 52 (1937) ; The Principles of Passing Sentences,
as Sheun by Cases in the Court of Criminal Appeal (1908-22), 86 JusT. P. 61, 75, 86
(1922); Ross, THE COURT OF CRIMINAL ArPA. ch. 7 (1911).
8. For a substantial bibliography on sentencing, see House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Federal Sentencing Procedures, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-65 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Federal Sentencing Procedures].
9. Typical responses of federal judges to a Congressional survey on sentencing prob-
lems include:
We [the judges] have the experience. It has no substitute.
No set of criteria or allegedly uniform principles . . .could possibly substitute
for the day [to day] and face to face experiences of the trial judge.
The trial judge is peculiarly fitted to impose sentence in the first instance ....
Federal Sentencing Procedures 97, 100.




growing criticism of present techniques of sentencing" reveals a need to in-
quire further into the processes of the sentencing decision.
The sentencing decision ordinarily seeks to accomplish one or more of the
multiple objectives of criminal sanctions: rehabilitation of the convicted of-
fender into a noncriminal member of society; isolation of the offender from
society to prevent criminal conduct during the period of confinement ;"-' de-
terrence of other members of the community who might have tendencie-.
toward criminal conduct similar to those of the offender (secondary deter-
rence), and deterrence of .the offender himself after release ;13 conmunity con-
demonation or the reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintain-
ing respect for the norms themselves ;14 and retribution or the satisfaction of
the community's emotional desire to punish the offender." To make a reasoned
sentencing decision a sentencing authority must determine the priority and
relationship of these objectives in each particular case.16
Often, more than one aim-indeed, perhaps all-are relevant to the appro-
priate sentence. All may dictate the same type of disposition-incarceration.
for example.'7 In order to fix the quantum of incarceration 1 8 to be applied,
11. See, e.g., Glueck, Predictive Devices and the Individualization of Justice, 23 LAw
& CONTM P. PROB. 461 (1958).
12. Many of the most dangerous criminals are simply "warehoused." Morris, Sen-
tentcing Convicted Criminals, 27 Ausn.. L.J. 186, 189 (1953). In America's best known
"warehouse," the federal penitentiary at Alcatraz, California, the average sentence of the
288 prisoners on June 30, 1958 was twenty-two years and one month. U.S. ButnL% OF
Paxsoxs, DEP'T OF JusTIcE; FEDERAL PRIsoNs 84 (1958) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL
PRaso Ns].
13. See Wm~UAms, SAsvoxn- ox JRmisPRuDExcE 111 (11th ed. 1957); Ball. The
Deterrence Concept n Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRi. L., C. & P.S. 347 (1955).
See generally, Andenaes, General Prevention-Ilusion or Reality?, 43 J. Cwan. L., C. &
P.S. 176 (1952). On the subject of probation as a primary deterrent, see NATIONAL PLU-
DaTioN & PAROLEt Ass'x, GUIDES FOR SENEcING 12-17 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
GUIDES FOR SENTENCING].
14. See, e.g., Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAwV & CONTEUiP. Psuu. 401,
404-06 (1958).
15. See, e.g., Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 23 Am. J. Suozu.GY 577
(1918). Commurity condemnation may be distinguished from retribution in that the former
is reprobative while the latter is vindicative. See Cohen, Moral Aspects of the rint.nal
Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1009-12, 1017 (1940).
16. "A penal code that reflected only a single principle would be a very bad une...
The problem ... is one of the priority and relationship of purposes as well as of their
legitimacy-of multivalued rather than of singlevalued thinldng." Hart, mupra note 14,
at 401.
17. Sentencing authorities normally can choose between a suspended sentence, pro-
bation, a fine, incarceration, or a combination of these. See GUmDs FOR SENTMECING 12-24.
If the sentence is to be incarceration, the sentencing authority may have a choice of in-
stitutions to which the offender can be committed. E.g., ConNzr. GE.. STAT. §§ 17-4024
(school for boys under sixteen), §§ 17-369-78 (school for girls under sixteen), §§ 17-356-&8
(State Farm for Women), §§ 17-382-401 (Reformatory for men, sixteen to twenty-five),
§§ 18-23 (State Prison for Women), §§ 18-1-22 (State Prison for men) (1958).
18. There are two basic forms of incarcerative sentences: (1) the definite sentenct
in which the sentencing authority sets the maximum sentence as a fixed term of years, aud
14551960]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
however, the sentencing authority must consider the different policies under-
lying each aim and determine its relative significance in the particular case.
Consider the case of three youthful first-offenders convicted of robbery. No
violence was used and the stolen money was recovered. Because of the wide-
spread incidence of juvenile offenses, the need to deter others similarly in-
clined might suggest a substantial period of incarceration. Yet, in the light
of -the age of the offenders, the absence of violence, and the recovery of the
stolen money, community condemnation and retribution might be satisfied by
confinement for a lesser period. And, considering the offenders' youth and
brief criminal careers, rehabilitation might be effected by a relatively brief
incarceration. The problem of choice would not be difficult if these different
aims could be administered simultaneously without interfering with each other.
But the rehabilitation of the offender may be impeded if the duration of incar-
ceration is prolonged beyond the -time necessary to prepare him to return to
society.19 The duration of imprisonment prescribed will therefore depend on
which of these aims is considered most important.
In some cases, the sentencing authority's evaluation of these competing ob-
jectives will be relevant not only to the quantum of punishment but also to
the type of sanction imposed. Suppose a respected leader of the community.
while driving under the influence of alcohol, hits and kills a pedestrian. If the
sentencing authority emphasizes rehabilitation, it might order probation. The
shock of 'having dlled another combined with the continuing supervision
afforded by probation may be sufficient to ensure that the defendant will not
offend again. Community condemnation, were this the dominant aim, might
be satisfied by the stigma of arrest, trial, and attendant publicity, and a sus-
the earliest possible release date is a fraction of that period or a specific number of years
determined by the parole eligibility statute; (2) the indeterminate sentence in which the
sentencing authority sets both the minimum and the maximum term of incarceration, and
the earliest possible release date is at the expiration of the minimum sentence or some fraction
thereof as determined by the parole eligibility statute. These definitions have substantial
expansions and variations between jurisdictions. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model
Penal Code, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 528 (1958); see 50 HIlv. L. Rvv. 677 (1937) ;
10 W. REs. L. REv. 574 (1959). Connecticut has an indeterminate sentencing system in
which the trial judge sets a minimum and a maximum sentence within the statutory maxi-
mum for the offense. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-121 (1958). For some crimes, the dt.,-
cretion of the judge (and the appellate tribunal) are limited by mandatory sentences
imposed by statute. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-121 (habitual criminal, 30 yr.
maximum), §§ 53-10-11 (first and second degree murder) (1958), § 19-265 (narcotics
offenders) (Supp. 1959).
19. "Much bitterness is engendered in many prisoners who have otherwise admirably
responded to rehabilitation programs by the knowledge that they must be incarcerated
for a purely arbitrary period .... ." Letter from Deputy Att'y Gen. Lawrence E. Walsh
to Hon. James 0. Eastland, July 25, 1958, in S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1958), reprinted in U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEws 3891, 3904-05 (1958). See also, id.




pended sentence.20 On the other hand, retribution for this criminally negli-
gent homicide might call for a substantial fine and a period of incarceration.
And, finally, the deterrence of potential offenders might suggest a prolonged
period of imprisonment since drunken driving is such a common practice that
substantial sanctions are necessary to impress upon the community the dangers
involved in this type of conduct. Thus, to determine the appropriate type and
degree of sanction to be applied, the sentencing authority must decide which
aim is primarily to be implemented and the relative weight to be assigned to
secondary aims.
2 1
The sentencing authority must also consider the impact of its determination
upon the operation of other agencies responsible for the administration of the
criminal law.2 For example, the successful performance of the prosecutor's
function depends in part upon the disposition of many cases by means of a plea
of guilty; expensive and time consuning jury trials are avoided, and victims
and witnesses are relieved from the ordeal of testifying in court.2 * A judge
who, pursuant to prosecutor recommendation, is willing to make sentencing
concessions can assist in obtaining guilty pleas. But a sentence which accom-
modates the prosecutor may inhibit implementation of the dominant criminal
law aim in a given case. 24 Consider the case of the professional criminal. He
is probably cognizant of the potentialities of plea bargaining and realizes that
the state would prefer to avoid the delay and expense of a trial. Realizing that
he stands in danger of receiving a harsh sentence on the basis of his prior
record, he may offer a plea of guilty in exchange for a sentencing concession.
Since isolation of the offender and deterrence of others may call for a severe
sentence when professional criminals are involved, the sentencing authority
20. Gumzs FOR SENTENCING 23-24. For a dramatic description of the stigma attaclze
to conviction, see Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United
States, 33 B.U.L. REv. 176, 193 (1953). See also Goldstein, Police Discretion not To
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 YA. L.J. 543, 590-92 (1960).
21. The classic statement of this problem is that in Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa.
D. & C. 285 (C.P. 1930) (Stem, J.). For other "hypothetical cases" and the suluium,
of a federal judge, see Yankwich, Individualization of Punishment in the Federal Courts,
20 F.R.D. 385, 391-92 (1958).
22. The police, the prosecutor, the grand jury, the judge, the petit jury, and the
agencies of probation, prison administration, parole, and pardon all have interrelated
responsibilities for the enforcement of the criminal law. For a graphic representation
of these decision-makers, see Goldstein, supra note 20, at 563. See generally Ohlin & Rem-
ington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect upon Systens for the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 23 LAw & CONEP. PRoB. 495, 496 (1958).
23. See Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideraio s: A Study of Bargain Justice.
46 J. Cmm. L., C. & P.S. 780 (1,956) ; Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956) ; Hearings 51-52.
24. "Such reasons [a plea of guilty] for mitigating sentence are predicated upon
practical administrative considerations and do not reflect the belief that a defendant
who pleads guilty is a better prospect for reformation." Comment, 66 YA.E L.J. 204,
219 & n.77 (1956). Consider the "repentance" rationale for mitigating sentence in ex-
change for a plea of guilty. Id. at 209-11.
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cannot accommodate the prosecutor unless he relegates these aims to a secon-
dary position. The sentencing authority's decision will also affect the role of de-
cision-makers who operate in the post-sentencing phases of the criminal process.
The provision for a parole board reflects a policy that the precise duration of
incarceration should not be fixed at trial, but should be determined by authori-
ties at a later stage who have an opportunity to view and evaluate the offender's
conduct and progress toward rehabilitation while in prison. Moreover, it
represents a judgment that gradual return to the community under continuing
supervision may better prepare the offender to assume societal responsi-
bilities.25 If the spread between the maximum and minimum sentence is nar-
row, however, the opportunity for early parole is extinguished and the parole
authority is deprived of the opportunity to exercise the discretionary function
assigned to it.
20
In order properly to assess the relative importance of all these considerations,
the sentencing authority must decide what information about the offender and
his offense is relevant to the sentencing decision. In those states which require
preparation of presentence reports, detailed information will be collected and
made available to the sentencing authority.2 7 TPhis composite of information
will not, however, obviate the need for selective evaluation. What, for example,
is the significance to the aims of sentencing in any given case of such personal
factors as age, sex, family status, and employment record? And how should
the weight to be assigned to such factors vary according to the nature of the
crime committed?
The present practice of giving wide discretion to the sentencing authority.
coupled with the lack of criteria to assist him in correlating information about
the offender and the offense with the aims of sentencing, contribute to dis-
parity in the type or degree of sanction applied to similar offenders who have
25. These policies were the rationale behind the 1958 federal indeterminate sentence
act. FEDERAL PRISONS 44. The act permits the trial judge to make the offender eligible
for parole at any time or to set a minimum parole eligibility date earlier than the former
date of one-third of the sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1958). However, the act has been
sparingly used (124 times as of June 4, 1959). Devitt, Improvements in Federal Sentencing
Procedures, 24 F.R.D. 147, 153 (1959).
On the other hand, Professor Cohen warns that "a man's conduct in prison is not
always the best indication of what he will do when released. And in point of fact prison
officials can be and have been influenced by political and social pressure." Cohen supra
note 15, at 1022.
26. Connecticut refuses its prisoners eligibility for parole until the minimum term
has been served. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125 (1958). This minimum term imposed by
the trial judge is modified by the Connecticut "good -time" statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. §
18-7 (Supp. 1959).
For other avenues of influence see e.g., State v. Tardiff, Conn. S.R.D., Aug. 21, 19.58
(court urged that fourteen to fifteen year sentence not be reduced by parole or pardon).
27. For discussion of the contents and form of presentence reports, see GUItES 1OR




committed similar offenses.28 Disparity without a rational basis not only
offends principles of justice, but may have an inhibiting effect on the treat-
ment phase of criminal law administration as well. Prisoner morale bears a
vital relationship to prisoner response -to the rehabilitative process and may
be adversely affected if the offender believes that his sentence is the product
of the prejudices or idiosyncracies of a particular judge. In the opinion of
one parole official: "All prisoners have a certain grudge against the sentencing
judge, but the hardest ones to work with are those who, after asking around
and comparing, decide that their sentences represent a particular judge's harsh
treatment. '2 9 Recognition of the problems created by disparate sentences duets
not, however, compel the conclusion that all offenders who commit the same
offense ought to receive the same sentence-the theory of "uniform sentencing."
There may be differentiating personal and social factors which require "indi-
vidualization"-different sentences for offenders who have engaged in the
same antisocial conduct.30 But if a system of individualization is to satisfy
objections against disparity, the disparity inherent in individualization must
result from the articulated application of uniform criteria designed to effectuate
agreed-upon goals.
28. Arguments about disparity are typified by Judge Goodman's statement that "I
have never found a pigeon-hole into which I could put any two cases, let alone aniy two
offenders," Goodman, In Defense of Federal Judicial Sentencing, 46 CALIF. L. Th,,. 497,
498 (1958), and the effort of Bureau of Prisons Director Bennett to do that job of pigeon-
holing by comparing cases, Hearings 57-66.
Disparity in type of disposition is illustrated by the use of probation in the federd
courts in fiscal 1958-25.3% of the 324 federal offenders in the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana, 54.2% of the 190 offenders in the Western District of Louisiana. FEImnaL PaIsuNS
114. The percentage of offenders probationed varied from 69% in Vermont to 19,, ;,
the Western District of Tennessee. Hearigs 45.
Disparity in degree of incarcerative sanctions is suggested by comparison of punishment
for the same offense in different federal districts--in 1957 the average sentence for liquor
law violations was approximately 3.75 years in the Northern District of Indiana, 10 months
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Hearings 48. See generally, id. at 45-69. Di6-
parity may exist between judges in a single jurisdiction. See GAUDEr, IN-Q tVIU' L Dn-
FERENCES IN THE SENTENCING TENDENCIES OF JUDGES (Arch. Psychol. Series No. 23%,
1938) (a study of six judges in one New Jersey county during a nine-year period).
A substantial bibliography is collected in INs-rrrTT OF JUDIcIAL .DM'INSSTATzO.N,
DISPARITr IN SENTENCING OF CoNvicTED DEFENDANTS (1954).
29. Statement of State Parole Officer, quoted in CONNECTICUT GovE:o.'s Puowz
STuDY CommITrr FIRsr INTER M REPORr 1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Prusox SrTvy
REPORT] ; accord; Hearings 52 (Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, James V. Bennett).
See also, Ashe, A Warden's View on, Inequality of Sentences, 5 FrE. PROD. No. 1, p. 26
(1941) ; McGuire & Holtzoff, The Problem of Sentences in the Criminal Lau, 4 FLP.
PROB. No. 4, p. 20 (1940).
30. Definitions of individualization are numerous. See, e.g., Glueck, Predictive De-
vices and the Individualization of Justice, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoa. 461 (1958) ; Sallielles,
The Individualization of Punishment 8-10 (Jastrow tr., 4 Modern Criminal Science Series)
(1911); Cohen, supra note 15, at 1019.
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THE CONNECTICUT SENTENCE REVIEV DIVISION
Origin, Structure, and Initial Performance
Connecticut's introduction of appellate review of criminal sentences repre-
sents an attempt to solve some of the problems inherent in the sentencing
process. In 1956, the Governor of Connecticut appointed a special committee
to ascertain the causes of unrest among the prison population.8 ' Among
other factors, the committee noted the relationship between prisoner discontent
and alleged "inequality of sentences" imposed by different judges for the
same crime.3 2 Although the committee opposed the principle of uniform sen-
tencing and endorsed instead the principle of individualization, it emphasized
that "as long as a prisoner feels that he has been denied review of a sentence
which he deems unfair or unduly harsh 'he remains a source of trouble in the
prison system." 33 The committee therefore recommended establishment of a
system of expeditious and effective sentence review, enabling the offender to
"enter the crucial first stage of prison life with at least one less grievance and
-with a feeling that his sentence does not represent the bias and prejudice of
a single judge. '34 Additionally, the committee hoped that the power of the appel-
late tribunal to demand from the trial judge an explanation of his reasons for a
particular sentence, its power to modify sentences, and its obligation to publish
the reasons for the disposition of every appeal, would encourage trial judges to
rationalize the sentencing function and to justify the sentences they impose or
uphold. 35 More important was the belief that the opinions of the reviewing
31. In response to prisoner "grievances" presented during a riot, Governor Ribicoff
appointed a Prison Study Committee composed of Patrick B. O'Sullivan, retired justice
of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut; Rev. John Bonn of Fairfield University;
Warren Mottram, Connecticut business man; Rosemary Park, President of Connecticut
College for Women at New London; and Eugene V. Rostow, dean of the Yale Law
School. Hartford Courant, July 31, 1956, p. 1, col. 8. The committee constllted with a
number of nationally known figures in the field of penology. Hartford Courant, Aug. 3,
1956, p. 1, cols. 1-8.
32. PRIsoN STUDY REPORT 1. Later reports of the committee dealt with revanping
the State's coriiationat system.
33. Id. at 1-2.
34. Id. at 9-10; see note 28 supra.
35. PRISON STUDY REPORT 10.
Speaking of the English Court of Criminal Appeal, -the Lord Chief Justice of England
noted:
It is not so much that a conviction is sometimes quashed or a sentence is some-
times reconsidered. What matters, and matters profoundly, is that everybody en-
gaged in administering the criminal law upon whatever rung of the ladder he may
be, throughout the whole hierarchy, is well aware that a Court of Criminal Appeal
is in existence. The consequences of the diffused and abiding knowledge are quite
incalculable.
Address of the Lord Chief Justice of England, Rt. Hon. Baron Hewart of Bury to the
Twelfth Annal Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association, 5 CAN. B. REv. 564, 572 (1927).
See also Wyzanski, supra note 10, at 1292-93.
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authority would develop a uniform set of principles for sentencing and ensure
the application of these principles throughout the state.3'
To establish a review system which would best achieve these goals, the
Prison Study Committee examined procedures used in other jurisdictions which
permit reduction of sentences set within statutory limits. Nine states employ
traditional channels of review, joining sentence appeal with appeals against
conviction 37 The reviewing court is empowered only to affirm or reduce
the sentence set below.38 As in appeals against conviction, the offender him-
self does not appear before the reviewing court. Theoretically, such a pro-
cedure might achieve adequate sentence review. In practice, it does not. First,
the inordinate time, money, and effort consumed in prosecuting an appeal
through normal channels limits the opportunity for review.30 Second, a review
conducted in the absence of the offender deprives the reviewing court of what-
ever value demeanor evidence may have in the sentencing process.40 Moreover,
if one purpose of review is to facilitate the rehabilitative process by convincing
the offender that he has had another opportunity for full and fair consideration
of his sentence, his appearance before the review tribunal would seem essential. 4'
Third, the power to alter sentence in conjunction with the power to hear appeals
from conviction is a temptation to some appellate courts to "correct" non-
reversible trial errors by reducing the sentence. If criminal sanctions are to
be used to achieve the various aims of the criminal law, such errors should
36. Letter From Chairman O'Sullivan to Governor Ribicoff, Dec. 3, 1956 (accompany-
ing PPRsoN SrTuy RPoar).
37. See, e.g., Heartsill v. State, 341 P.2d 625 (Okla. Crim. 1959) ; Commonwealth
v. Green, 396 Pa- 137, 151 A2d 241 (1959). Occasionally there are appeals against
sentence alone. Guedea v. State, 162 Neb. 680, 77 N.W.2d 166 (1956) ; Parsons v. State,
156 Neb. 847, 58 N.V2d 182 (1953).
38. See note 4 supra.
39. Availability of appeals in forma pauperis may alleviate the financial burden in some
states. See -Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
40. The value of demeanor evidence in the sentencing area remains a matter of dispute.
Federal judges who oppose appellate review state: "[T]he judge . . . has had an
opportunity to observe the defendant personally, in many instances to see and hear him
testify, to determine his attitude toward the courts and toward society and to analyze his
character, his personality, his background ... ." Federal Sentencing Procedures 118. See
also id. at 116(2)-(3), 119 (11)-(12). On the other hand: "If ever there is a situation
in which it is impossible to make a balanced assessment of the personality of the person
undergoing it, it is the 'day in court' .... One does not gain a balanced insight of a man
by observing him only in times of one of the greatest stresses to which he can be sub-
jected.' Morris, Sentencing Convicted Crinials, 27 Ausm.. LJ. 186, 193-94 (1953).
41. One Connecticut observer suggests that a review hearing offers the offender a
chance to "blow off steam."*
42. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals frequently "corrects" errors below
by reducing sentence. See e.g., Glassgow v. State, 88 Okla. Crim. 279, 202 P2d 999 (1949)
("give the defendant the benefit of the doubt" on the issue of prejudicial error) ; McKinnon
v. State, 299 P2d 535 (Okla. Crim. 1956) (objectionable questions by prosecutor warrant
reduction) ; Johnson v. State, 305 P.2d 1051 (Okla. Crim. 1957) (erroneous admission
of hearsay evidence corrected). Perhaps the number of such "corrections" is related to
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have no relation to the determination of the most appropriate sentence.4 3
Fourth, the opinions of these tribunals do not disclose any effort to articulate
and establish criteria for sentencing. Many opinions consist simply of a dis-
cussion of the points of law raised on appeal, the mention of a few personal
factors concerning the offender, and a short statement that "under all the
circumstances" the sentence below is affirmed or reduced.1 4 Fifth, when the
original sentence imposed is too short to achieve the relevant criminal law
goals, the lack of power to increase sentences not only prevents satisfactory
disposition of the individual offender, but also inhibits the development of a
complete and consistent body of sentencing principles.
46
For these reasons, Connecticut rejected the idea of assigning the sentence-
review function to its Supreme Court of Errors.46 Instead, it adopted a modi-
fied form of the review system used in Massachusetts 47 and established a Re-
view Division of the Superior Court.48 By statute, the Connecticut Sentence
Review Division is composed -of three Superior Court trial judges and is em-
powered to review sentences which direct incarceration for one year or more
in the state prison,40 and to substitute any sentence that the trial judge could
have imposed, including an increased term.0° Upon imposition of sentence,
Oklahoma's system of allowing juries to fix the sentence. OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
926-27 (1958) ; see State v. Yediares, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 17, 1958 (erroneous presentation
of the offender's prior record to the sentencing judge corrected by reduction).
43. Some observers, however, feel that the value of these reductions lies in the fact
that they prevent unnecessary new trials. 18 NEE. L. Rxv. 300, 303 (1939). See Hall, at
771-75, 783.
44. People v. Downs, 172 N.Y.S2d 377, 5 A.D.2d 935 (1958) ; PRIsoN Srv Ra.E'oRT
7-8; see, e.g., Rahal v. State, 320 P.2d 716, 719 (Okla. Crim. '1958) (sentence reduced in
"interests of justice and fair play").
45. We have all observed instances of excessive sentences but, just as frequently,
we have noted instances of commitments far too short to enable institutional authori-
ties to educate and train the individual to take his place in the community as a law
abiding self-respecting citizen.
C(Tief Justice Warren, Introduction to GLuEcic & GLulCwC, PREDIcTING DEINQUnNCY xix
(1959). (Emphasis added.) See also S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), re-
printed in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N-ws 3891, 3893 (1958).
46. PRISON STUDY REPORT 7-8. The Court has consistently held that it does not in-
herently possess such power. State v. La Porta, 140 Conn. 610, 102 A.2d 885 (1954);
State v. Van Allen, 140 Conn. 39, 97 A2d 890 (1953).
47. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 278, §§ 28A-D (1956).
48. Connnecticut's Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes punishable
by a sentence greater than a $500 fine and/or one year imprisonment. CONN. GtN. STA'r.
§§ 54-7, 54-17 (1958).
49. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-195 (1958). The legislation proposed by the Prison Study
Committee would have made appealable any sentence by the Superior Court "to a term
of imprisonment," PIsON STUDY REPoRr 12, presumably including reformatory or jail
sentences. As passed by the legislature, appeal was limited to those sentenced to the State
Prison for Men or the State Prison for Women.
50. The Prison Study Committee's draft legislation contained a provision allowing an
increase of sentence on appeal. PRIsON STUDY REPORT 13. The act initially passed by the
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the clerk of the sentencing court must give the offender written notice of his
right to appeal to the Review Division within thirty days, and notice of the
possibility that -his sentence will be increased on appeal.r1 While the Division
has construed the statute to prevent it from considering evidence which was
not before the trial judge,5 2 such as post-sentence rehabilitation and "coopera-
tion," the statute allows the Division to require the production of presentence
reports and "any other records, documents, or exdzibits connected with such
review proceedings."53 The trial judge may submit a statement of his reasons
for a particular sentence to the Division and the Division may require the sub-
mission of such a statement."4 The most important change from the Massachu-
setts procedure is the requirement that the Division hand down a written
opinion stating the reasons for the disposition of each appeal.
In practice, the Division's panel of judges has been rotated among the
judges of the Superior Court.rG* Every appellant is permitted to appear
before the Division and is allowed representation by counsel.57 The State's
Attorney from the county in which the offender was prosecuted appears at
the hearing for the state.* In lieu of requiring the trial judge to prepare a state-
ment of reasons for a particular sentence, the Division sends for the transcript
of the arguments of the State's Attorney and the defense counsel together with
the comments of the trial judge in open court on sentencing day.r8 Thus the
Division has before it the presentence report, the transcript of sentencing day
proceedings, and other documents, such as psychiatric studies, which were
ibefore the primary sentencing authority.* In addition, the Secretary of the
Division prepares a synopsis of these documents for each judge of the Divi-
legislature did not permit increases in sentence. Conn. Pub. Laws, Jan. Sess. 1957, P.A.
436, S. 2. Some observers protested that the lack of this power would cause the Sentence
Review Division to be swamped with frivolous appeals. Hartford Courant, Oct. 2, 1957,
p. 2, col. 1-3. The act was then amended to give the Division the power to increase
sentence. Conn. Pub. Laws, Sept. Spec. Sess. 1957, P.A. 14, § 2, Co.N. Gm;. STAT.
§ 51-196 (1958).
51. CocN. Gmn. STAT. § 51-195 (1958). The Prison Study Committee felt that a thirty
day appeal period would be an improvement over the three-day period in use in Massachu-
setts by allowing the offender an opporumty to recover from the shock of conviction.
Parso. STuDY REPor 10. The notice provision of the statute, a modification of the
Massachusetts procedure, is an effort on the part of the committee to avoid any double
jeopardy claim. Ibid. For further discussion of this problem, see.id., appendix.
52. Connecticut v. Ferrini, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 20, 1959; State v. 'fHrrls, 21 Conn.
Supp. 448, 159 A.2d 188 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct 1958).
53. CoNN. GEw. STAT. § 51-196 (1958).
54. Ibid.
55. CxN. GEN. STAT. § 51-196 (1958).
56. In addition, when the Division panel reviews a sentence imposed by one of its
members, that member is disqualified and replaced. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-194 (1958).
57. See Review Division of Superior Court, Rules and Regulations, § I. The draft
legislation proposed by the Prison Study Committee followed the Massachusetts statute
in making a hearing mandatory only in cases of increases. PRIsoN STUDY RE T 11. None
of the revisions of the Review Division Statute have contained any provision for hearing.
58. Review Division of Superior Court, Rules and Regidatlions § 2.
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sion.59 Normally the Division will hand down its written opinion within a
month after the hearing.* The Division sits as its business requires, meeting
approximately one day every two months to dispose of less than twenty-five
cases. To date, -the Division 'has heard two hundred-fifty-six appeals, reducing
fifteen sentences and increasing seven. s0 In only one case was the type of
punishment imposed ,by the trial judge changed."'
The relatively small number of sentence modifications 02 has been explained
by some members of the Division 'by reference to the class of criminals who
appeal their sentences.* Since the Division has the power to increase as well
as decrease sentences, creating a risk for the appellant, the majority of appeals
have come from those prisoners who have the least to lose, those sentenced
in the upper range of penalties for their offense. 3 Therefore, it is argued, the
bulk of appeals come from the most dangerous class of offenders in the prison."
It is implied that the Division might feel justified in modifying more sentences
if it met the less serious offenders. This line of reasoning indicates a basic
misconception of the philosophy which should underlie effective sentence re-
view. The conclusion that those serving 'high sentences are the most dangerous
59. These synopses are on file in the Review Division Office, 121 Elm Street, New
Haven, Conn. [In subsequent citations, these documents will be cited: Synopsis].
60. Tabulation taken from files of Sentence Review Division, July 5, 1960.
61. State v. Howarth, 21 Conn. Supp. 431, 158 A2d 865 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958).
The Massachusetts panel changes the type of sentence frequently. E.g., between June
1, 1954, and June 30, 1955, 24 sentences to the state prison were changed to 22 sentences
to the Reformatory and 2 sentences to the House of Correction. This represented more
than one-third of the 66 sentences (involving 33 individuals) modified by the Appellate
Division during that period. 31 Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, MASS.
PuB. Doc. No. 144, at 81-85 (1955).
62. Between 1943 and 1956, the Appellate Division of the Massachusetts Superior
Court acted upon more than 1200 appeals, decreasing approximately 350 sentences while
increasing less than twenty. 23-32 Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, MAss,
PUB. Doc. No. 144 (1946-1956). Several possible explanations might be suggested for
this wide discrepancy in sentence review results: (1) the absence of a requirement for a
written opinion may permit the Massachusetts panel a greater leeway in reflecting its
personal attitudes toward offenders and offenses than would be the case if it were forced
to formalize its decisions. This theory does not, however, explain the preponderance of
decreases in sentence. (2) Statutory sentencing policy in Massachusetts may be more
severe than in Connecticut. Compare the following maximum sentences:
MASS. ANN. LAWS cl. 265 CoNN. GEN. STAT.
Manslaughter § 13 20 years § 53-13 15 yrs.
Armed Robbery § 17 life § 53-14 25 yrs.
Rape § 22 life § 53-238 30 yrs.
Assault with intent to rape § 24 life §'53-239 10 yrs.
3) A large segment of the Massachusetts modifications are actions making consecutive
sentences run concurrently. In Connecticut, only the maximum terms for separate offenses
can run consecutively; most minimum terms run concurrently. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-121
(1958). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-163 (1958).
63. The Division noted this fact in State v. Young, 21 Conn. Supp. 415, 158 A.2d 595
(Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958).
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offenders in the -prison assumes the answer of the very question which review
is intended to raise-whether the sentencing judge was correct in his classifi-
cation of .the offender. Moreover, there would seem to be no basis for assum-
ing that sentences in the higher ranges are either more or less correct than
sentences in a lower range.64 The Division's attitude toward higher sentences
may stem from excessive deference to the sentencing judge. Admittedly, the
judge who has seen the offender during trial may be better informed about
the defendant.6 5 But this advantage is not present in the far greater number
of cases in which the defendant has pleaded guilty, without being tried.c6 In
these cases the Review Division of three judges will have all of the information
which was before the sentencing judge, and probably a better opportunity
to gather demeanor evidence. For this reason, the Review Division should
approach each sentence with no assumptions based upon the length of the
sentence imposed below.
The infrequency of significant sentence modifications and the dc facto limita-
tion upon the class of offenders -who elect to appeal may detract from the
Division's usefulness as a device for alleviating alleged prisoner discontent
with "unfair" sentences. Prisoners regard the infrequency of modification as
evidence that the Division is a sham,67 thus removing any legitimizing influence
which review might afford. Even if there had been more sentence changes
made, however, the possibility of increased sentences prevents the potential
benefits of review from reaching a substantial number of offenders with low
sentences who may nevertheless believe their sentences to be unfair. Argu-
ably then, to the extent that alleviation of prisoner unrest is a goal of sentence
review, no prisoner ought to be discouraged by the threat of an increased
sentence from pursuing an appeal to the Review Division. Removing both
these impediments to prisoner acceptance of the review board, sentence review
might still fail to reduce prisoner discontent. One observer has suggested
that it is probably impossible to impress upon the prisoner mentality the con-
cept of individualized sentences tailored to effectuate sentencing goals, if
individualization results in a sentence greater than that received by others
64. The "class" of offenders with higher sentences will not include those convicted of
first or second degree murder, whose mandatory sentence, Coq. G.x. StAT. § 53-10, 11
(1958) precludes their appeal, CGoN. Gmr. STAT. § 51-196 (Supp. 1959).
65. For examples of deference based upon the trial judge's access to demeanor evidence,
see State v. Ferraro, Conn. S.R-D., Aug. 21, 1958; State v. Higgs, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 2,
1958; State v. Wade, Conn. S.R.D., Sept. 25, 195& For arguments pro and con on
value of demeanor evidence, see note 40 supra.
66. The distinction seems to have been overlooked in State v. Hacldey, 21 Conn. Supp.
412,158 A.2d 859 (Rev. Dev. Super. Ct. 1958) ; State v. no, Conn. S.R.D., June 30, 1958;
State v. Tardiff, Conn. S.RD., Aug. 21, 1958. In these cases the Division had before it
the same amount of information available to the trial judge. See text at notes 5S-59 .spra.
67. Letter From Inmate Leroy Nash to Connecticut Sentence Review Division, Apr.
18, 1958 on file in Sentence Review Division Office, 121 Elm Street, New Haven, Conn.:
"Your last seventeen decisions (today is July 18) caused a loud wail of 'I told you!
The dirty double- .' And the rehabilitation program took an abrupt nose dive"
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who have committed similar offenses.* The prisoner tends to make a shallow
comparison based only on the type of offense and possibly on the number of
prior convictions. 8 Therefore, alleviation of prisoner unrest may not be a
realistic goal of sentence review under any circumstances.
But these shortcomings do not compel the conclusion that the concept of
appellate review of sentencing ought to be abandoned. If the Review Division
can create and articulate uniform sentencing principles, it can make a major
contribution toward establishing an integrated and rationalized use of criminal
sanctions by all of the decision-makers in this area. Trial judges, for ex-
ample, would then be impelled not only to impose ,reasonable sentences but
also to justify affirmatively their decisions in terms w hich they feel will
accord with the Division's prior articulations of relevant sentencing aims.
Similarly, the State's Attorneys, whose recommendations may carry signifi-
cant weight with the trial judge, would be able to relate the factors underlying
their recommendations to sentencing goals which they have been able to ab-
stract from the Division's opinions. Defense attorneys could also draw on
these principles in their presentence argument and in plea bargaining negotia-
tions. And after the minimum term of incarceration has been served, the
Board of Parole would be able to compare the aims it considers relevant in
deciding whether to parole the offender with those considered dominant at
the time of his sentencing.
The Policy-Making Function
To improve sentencing decisions, the Review Division must write opinions
which clearly describe the relationship between the factors involved in a
specific case and the aim or aims of the criminal law that should be emphasized
in that case. With relatively few exceptions, the opinions of the Connecticut
panel have not satisfied this requirement. Some opinions give relatively clear
directions to trial judges. Others, if supplemented by a tentative process of
extrapolating principles from the facts apparently considered significant in
the opinion, may furnish limited guidance in future cases. But in a substantial
number, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to deduce what aim or aims
of the criminal law are being emphasized and, a fortiori, to abstract any sen-
tencing principles. Examination and comparison of individual Review Division
opinions will illustrate the kind of opinion which meets the demands of effective
review, as well as pointing out some of the inadequacies of the present
system.
One opinion in which the Division clearly enunciates sentencing objectives
is the case of an eighteen-year-old who pleaded guilty to one count of rape
and three counts of assault with intent to rape.60 He was sentenced to five to
68. State v. Young, 21 Conn. Supp. 415, 158 A.2d 594 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958). The
Prison Study Committee's pilot study was apparently based only upon type of crime and
number of prior offenses. PRISON STUDY REPORT 3-4
69. State v. Doak, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 7, 1958.
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ten years in the State Prison.70 On appeal from this sentence, the Review Di-
vision weighed the following factors: the defendant was eighteen years old;
all four of the offenses involved violence, two at knife-point ;71 the woman actually
raped was seven months pregnant ;72 the defendant had a prior criminal record 1'
-convictions for breaking and entering and use of a motor velicle without the
owner's permission; a psychiatric examination disclosed that the defendant
was of below-average intelligence; his home situation was "unfortunate"; and
the original sentence imposed was based on the recommendation of the State's
Attorney. 74 In these circumstances the Review Division apparently felt that
although community condemnation would not require an especially severe
sanction, isolation of the offender ought to be the dominant aim:
Sympathy for one so young in such a situation is understandable. How-
ever, the pattern of behavior in this case is disturbing... This defendant
was lying in wait for his victims, armed with a knife. There were four
separate deliberate attacks in a period of about six weeks. Under such
circumstances the protection of the public is the paramount consider-
ation and in our opinion the sentences are inadequate. A modification of
sentence is required. 75
Accordingly, the sentence was increased to eight to fifteen years. This opinion
suggests the following "sentencing principle" to a trial judge: where the offend-
er has committed repeated crimes of violence, isolation will ordinarily be the
dominant aim and will require a substantial period of incarceration notwith-
standing mitigating factors such as the offender's youth 70 and below-average
70. The mamun penalty for rape is thirty years. CoNix. GE.. STAT. § 53-238
(1958), and for assault with intent to rape, ten years, Co'rv. Gm. STAT. § 53-239 (1958).
71. The use or possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime is an aggra-
vating factor in all cases before the Division. See, e.g., State v. Cogswell, Conn. S.R.D.,
Oct. 7, 1958; State v. Montgomery, Conn. S.R.D., June 30, 1958; State v. Springer, Conn.
S.RD., Oct. 30, 195S; State v. Milton, Conn. S.R.D., Dec. 31, 1959. The theory behind
this reasoning is that those who carry weapons intend to use them.*
72. The poor physical or mental condition of the victim has been considered an aggra-
vating circumstance. See State v. Baptista, Conn. S.R.D., Mar. 6, 1959 (indecent assault
on an "old and infirm man") ; State v. Samson, Conn. S.R.D., May 3, 1960 (manslaughter
of three year old was "particularly brutal considering the fact that the cluld was defective
mentally").
73. Some observers of the Division's work were troubled by the publication of arrest
records and nolles in the Division's opinions.* See, e.g., State v. Fulton, Conn. S.R.D.,
Feb. 16, 1959. It is strongly denied by members of the Division that arrest records and
nolles are taken into account in reviewing sentence.* In recent cases, reports of arrests
and nolles have disappeared from Division opinions.
74. The recommendation of the State's Attorney is usually well received by Connecti-
cut trial judges and by the Review Division.* See State v. Carpenter, Conn. S.R.D., Dec.
28, 1959; State v. Gaul, Conn. S.R.D., Aug. 21, 1958; State v. Giovanelli, Conn. S.R.D.,
Feb. 10, 1959.
75. State v. Doak, Conn. S.R.D., Oct 7, 1958.
76. Age, however, is not always synonymous with favorable rehabilitative prospects.
The National Probation and Parole Association suggests that the date at which criminal
conduct first began may be more significant than the offender's age at the time of sentencing.
GurDEs FOR SmENciNG 38.
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intelligence. This principle could provide a starting point for the decision of
similar cases in the future. For example, if the offender urges other mitigating
factors such as absence of a prior triminal record, the trial judge might con-
lude that the dominant aim of isolation still requires a substantial sentence.
Or, if the offender were of above-average intelligence, the fact that community
condemnation now may call for a more severe punishment 17 would not neces-
sarily increase the period of detention required, for the original opinion made
clear that the sentence imposed was in excess of that required to satisfy the
aims of community condemnation or retribution.
The Division gave another example of its potential in a manslaughter case
where the defendant, who had pleaded guilty, had been sentenced to ten to twelve
years in the State Prison for Women.78 She ,had been drinking with her his-
band and -had stabbed him following a quarrel over money. The Division has
often conceded the importance of isolating the offender and deterring others in
cases involving the taking of a human life.79 But it also felt that rehabilitation
was important. The Division therefore examined the defendant's personal
background in order to ascertain the quantum of punishment which would best
serve 'both these aims. The defendant had no prior criminal record. She was
born in the South in very poor economic circumstances, was shifted from rela-
tive to relative during childhood, and gave birth to a stillborn child at the
age of thirteen. She had worked steadily since she was legally able to be em-
ployed.80 The State's Attorney characterized her marriage as 'happy with no
prior evidence of violence. Apparently neither he nor the Division believed
that the defendant, who had been drinking at the time,81 intended to kill her
'husband. In the light of these factors, the Division concluded that the aims
of deterrence and rehabilitation could adequately be served 'by a less severe
sentence and that prolonged isolation of this offender was not necessary:
77. The Division evidences disfavor toward offenders who have had the opportunities
inherent in advanced formal education. State v. Eveleigh, 21 Conn. Supp. 423, 158 A.2d
861 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958) ("cum laude graduate of an eastern college") ; State v.
Pistey, Conn. S.R.D., July 30, 1958 (three years of college) ; State v. Baker, Con. S.R.D.,
Oct. 20, 1959 (a lawyer who had many "opportunities").
7M State v. Hunter, Conn. S.R.D., Aug. 15, 1958. The maximum penalty for man-
slaughter in Connecticut is fifteen years. CoNx. G-x. STAT. § 53-13 (1958).
79. E.g., State v. Elliott, 21 Conn. Supp. 461, 159 A.2d 180 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct.
1958) ; State v. Frost, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 17, 1958; State v. Gaul, Conn. S.R.D., Aug.
21, 1958; State v. Jones, Conn. S.R.D., July 25, 1958.
80. Although authorities in the field of sentencing regard the offender's work record
as a major factor in determining the possibility of recidivism, see GLUECK & GLiEc1,
500 CRIMINAL CAREERS 281-82 (1930), the dnstant case is a rare example of the Division's
consideration of this point. Compare Jones v. State, 330 P.2d 1055 (Okla. Crim. 1958)
(defendant worked to support mother-4hree years for perjury reduced to two years).
81. The offender's intoxication at the time of the crime has been regarded as either
an aggravating factor or mitigating factor (as in the instant case). The Division's broadest
statement on this issue holds that drunkenness at the time of the crime "in no sense di-
minishes the crime nor makes less serious the nature of the crime." State v. Gagliola,
Conn. SR.D., Dec. 31, 1959.
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[W]e find that the minimum penalty imposed in this case is too severe.
It is not appropriate because it does not fit the defendant's make-up and
the nature of the crime committed by her. After the defendant has re-
ceived adequate punishment, she should be a good risk to be on parole.
Her past record including her steady working habits, her personality and
experience indicate that with proper guidance and supervision it is unlikely
that she will again commit the same type of crime. Weighing all factors
in this case we conclude that the minimum sentence should be eight years.8 2
A trial judge could probably conclude that, as a general principle, the absence
of intent to kill,83 coupled with an exemplary personal background, reduces
the quantum of punishment needed to satisfy the deterrent aim and permits
the likelihood of early rehabilitation to become a relevant factor.
The aims of rehabilitating the offender and of deterring other persons may
conflict, however. In that event one or the other must be selected as dominant,
and the Division has occasionally demonstrated the process of resolving such
conflicts. The defendant was convicted of fourteen counts of common-law burg-
lary and six counts of breaking and entering. He was sentenced to tvelve
to seventeen years in the State Prison.8 4 While these crimes involved no
violence, "the planning and execution of the operations had the earmarks of ex-
perts. The activities of the group 8 5 in burglarizing homes and stores were
among the most extensive that authorities had... to consider in a long time."80°
The offender's prior record consisted of only tvo offenses committed while
in military service, but the Division did not discuss the defendant's personal
background:
The sentences imposed upon the defendant are fair, reasonable, and ap-
propriate.... The activities of the present defendant were extraordinary
in respect to the multiplicity of crimes committed and the widespread
scope of them, in respect to the professional and organized character of
them, and in relation to the relatively major part he played in their com-
mission. ... The aim of punishment is not alone the rehabilitation of
the offender, but equally the protection of the public against such wide-
spread, organized, deliberate, premeditated, felonious criminal conduct.
82. State v. Hunter, Corn. S.R.D., August 15, 1958.
83. Intent is a factor frequently ruled to be aggravating by the Division. E.g., State
v. Mele, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 30, 1958; State v. Penn, Conn. S.R.D., Aug. 15, 1958; State
v. Johnson, 21. ,Conn. Supp. 381, 158 A.2d 746 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958) (armed robber
used no violence but he had a "violent intent").
84. State v. Daniels, Conn. S.R.D., Sept 25, 1958. The maxunum sentence for com-
mon law burglary is twenty years, CoNe. GEN. STAT. § 53-68 (1958) ; for breadng and
entering, four years, CoxN. Gax. STAT. § 53-76 (1958).
85. The Division will distinguish betveen co-defendants on the basis of prior record
and/or degree of participation in the crime. See State v. Cogswell, Conn. S.R.D., Oct.
7, 1958; State v. Tuscano, 21 Conn. Supp. 455, 158 A2d 598 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct 1958);
State v. Vitolo, Conn. S.R.D., Sept. 25, 1958 (the "brains of the operation").
86. Multiple crimes cause the Division to lay emphasis upon deterrence. State v.
Consiglio, Conn. S.R.D., Dec. 31, 1959; State v. Doak, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 7, 1958; State
v. Dunigan, Conn. S.R.D., Dec. 31, 1959.
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A substantial prison term serves the dual purpose of deterring the par-
ticular offender as well as others who may be similarly inclined.87
The implication that a long sentence was needed to deter the offender even
though a shorter sentence would rehabilitate him seems anomalous. Never-
theless, the opinion can be rationalized on the ground that the shorter reha-
bilitative sentence frustrated the aim of deterring other potential offenders. A
sentencing judge may conclude, therefore, that professional criminal conduct, "
indicating careful planning and culminating in a series of offenses, calls for
the emphasis upon the deterrent aim by the imposition of a high minimm
sentence in spite of the offender's relatively minor criminal record.
In some opinions, the Division fails to specify the relevant sentencing goals,
but instead simply lists certain facts about the offender and the offense which
are apparently treated as factors of aggravation or mitigation. From these
factors, the reader may be able to glean the determinative sentencing aims. In
one such case,89 the defendant was convicted of failure to keep a proper record
of the sale of a firearm. A sentence of two to three years was imposed 0° The
Division discussed the following factors: the defendant had previously been
convicted of assault with intent to kill as well as numerous minor offenses;
the offense in this case was a technical violation-the defendant kept a record
but not on the proper form; without the defendant's knowledge the gun was
later to be used in a series of murders for which the purchaser was under
sentence of death; the defendant's violation in no way impeded the investigation
of the murders. From these facts the Division concluded that the minimum
sentence should be reduced from two years to one year. What were the relevant
sentencing goals in this case? Rehabilitation was probably not determinative.
If this forty-seven-year-old offender's 91 background and prior record are em-
phasized, a one year minimum sentence might not effectuate his rehabilitation.
Moreover, he was convicted of only a technical statutory violation which did
not evidence the type of criminality ordinarily requiring rehabilitative incar-
ceration. Deterrence was probably relevant in the Division's decision to reduce
sentence. Surely, a minimal prison sentence would have been sufficient to
induce the offender and other dealers in firearms to record their sales on the
87. State v. Daniels, Conn. S.R.D., Sept. 25, 1958.
88. "Professional criminals" are sternly dealt with by the Division. State v. Marfeo,
Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 15, 1958; State v. Onorato, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 17, 1958; State v,
Rulli, Conn. S.RD., Oct. 17, 1958; State v. Springer, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 30, 1958;
State v. J. Smith, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 2, 1958. For a definition of "professional criminal,"
see MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRImINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 22-23 (1940);
MonE. PENAL CODE §§ 7.03(2), 7.04(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
89. State v. X. Because some of the information quoted in text is from confidential
documents, the name of this case is Withheld.
90. The offense is punishable by a maximum of three years in State Prison. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 29-37 (1958).
91. Before the Division, age is normally the reciprocal of rehabilitative possibility.
See State v. Baker, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 20, 1959 (52 years old) ; State v. Consiglio, Con.
S.R.D., Dec. 31, 1959 (42 years old).
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proper form. Indeed a fine and a suspended sentence, as recommended by the
State's Attorney, would probably have served this purpose. The one-year
minimum sentence might have been retained, however, to deter activity of a
more general nature. The offender had been described as "one of those busi-
nessmen who operate on the fringe areas of the law ... the results of ...
[whose] behavior are often far-reaching and serious to the rest of society." '
The result may also be explained as an expression of community condem-
nation. Here the Division's opinion could have given significant guidance by
defining the limits of applicability of this aim. Was the Division intimating
that this offender was more blameworthy because the gun he sold was later
used in a murder?9 3 Or, did the fact that he was an operator "on the fringe
areas of the law" -urn his technical violation into an event which merited the
community's condemnation? While a trial judge might thus limit somewhat the
possibly relevant sentencing aims, he could not with certainty deduce any
generally applicable sentencing principles from this case.
A similar opinion dealt with -the case of a police chief who had pleaded
guilty to embezzling more than 6000 dollars from the local Police Benevolent
Fund.9 4 He appealed a sentence of from two to four years, the statutory
maximum for this offense being ten years.05 The Division's brief opinion
noted that the defendant had readily admitted his guilt Do and that full resti-
tution 'had been made.97 It weighed the offender's "many years of fine service
to the community" and felt that it was "obvious that the defendant's extensive
drinking contributed to the sorry state in which he found himself, financially
92. Synopsis, State v. X.
93. In reply to the State's Attorney's recommendation of a 1300 fine and a one
year suspended sentence, the sentencing judge remarked:
That recommendation I cannot accept. I would sooner see him walk out of
this courtroom with a complete nolle than the let this man walk out with a three
hundred dollar fine, the man who sold the guns to [the convicted murder] which
resulted in the kilings .... "My only regret is that I've got a three year maximum.
Sywpsis, State v. X.
94. State v. Cattaneo, Conn. S.R.D., Apr. 1, 1959.
95. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53-354 (1958).
96. The defendant's confession is ordinarily praised by the Division but it is yet to
be reflected in a sentence reduction. See, e.g., State v. Reid, Conn. S.R.D., June 30,
1958; State v. Jaresko, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 7, 1958. A failure to confess may be regarded
as an aggravating factor. See State v. Colluccio, Conn. S.R.D., Sept. 11, 1958; State v.
Tuscano, 21 Conn. Supp. 455, 158, A.2d 598 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958). If, in sex
cases, the failure to confess forces complaining w itnesses to take the stand, the offender
will be persona non grata before the Division. See State v. Owens, 21 Conn. Supp. 418,
158 A2d 867 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958). A voluntary arrest will help the defendant
before the Division. See State v. Carter, 21 Conn. Supp. 426, 158 A2d 862 (Rev. Div.
Super. Ct. 1958) (second offense, narcotics-ten to twelve reduced to five to ten).
97. The Division has yet to reflect the restitution of stolen property in a reduction
of sentence. See State v. Rothermel, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 15, 1958 (restitution of $344
is "to their credit"--sentence affirmed); State v. Rulli, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 17, 1958.
Compare -Glenn v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 165, 114 P.2d 192 (1941) (restitution by surety
is a mitigating factor-sentence reduced).
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and .matrimonially."8 Despite the mention of these mitigating factors, the
Division affirmed the sentence imposed. Isolation and deterrence of the offender
were probably not the paramount aim-he is unlikely ever again to find
himself in a position of substantial trust. Secondary deterrence may have been
relevant but was apparently not dominant, for the comparatively low minimum
sentence was affirmed. Nor does rehabilitation of the offender seem to have
been determinative; since the Division attributed the offense to .the defendant's
alcoholic and matrimonial difficulties, probation accompanied by professional
counseling would have been a more suitable rehabilitative device than incar-
ceration. The desire for retribution was apparently mitigated by the full resti-
tution of the stolen funds. Community condemnation, therefore, was probably
the determinative aim. In terms of the offense, a breach of trust by a high
police official demanded incarceration, to reaffirm the standard of conduct de-
manded of persons in a position of trust.99 But since the opinion fails to discuss
any of these sentencing aims, the reliability of the sentencing principle extracted
is slight.
An implied resolution of two competing aims of sentencing may be sur-
mised from a case which involved a wife convicted of the manslaughter of her
husband.10 0 The defendant 'had been indicted for first degree murder, was
permitted to plead guilty to manslaughter,0 1 and received a sentence of from
ten to twelve years.10 2 The Division's opinion reviewed the facts of the case
and concluded that "the charge to which she pleaded guilty is a serious one
and the events described herein certainly do not justify the killing of her hus-
band." It also emphasized, 'however, that her 'husband had been a "man of
poor repute." Throughout the seventeen years of their married life he had
used violence upon her and had carried on adulterous relationships with other
women. The sentence was reduced to five to twelve years. Because the Di-
vision felt that the crime was "induced" by the decedent's prior conduct,
98. Alcoholic tendencies are normally weighed against the defendant by the Division.
State v. Eveleigh, 21 Conn. Supp. 423, 158 A.2d 861 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958). State
v. King, Conn. S.R.D., Aug. 21, 1958; State v. Thorpe, Conn. S.R.D., Feb. 16, 1959.
Occasionally, however, alcoholism may mitigate. See State v. Daley, Conn. S.R.D., Sept.
25, 1958 (mitigating factor in co-defendant's sentence).
99. The betrayal of a position of trust it always an aggravating factor. See State
v. Salta, 21 Conn. Supp. 477, 159 A.2d 187 (Rev. Div. Super Ct. 1958). See also Gutoas
FOR SENTENCING 33.
100. State v. Dinardo, Conn. S.R.D., July 22, 1959.
101. The indictment for first degree murder does not receive mention in the Division's
opinion. New Haven Evening Register, June 4, 1958, p. 42, col. 5. Ordinarily those in-
dicted for second degree murder are reminded of their luck in being allowed to plead
guilty to manslaughter. See State v. Pemberton, Conn. S.R.D., Oct. 7, 1958; State v.
Tardiff, Conn. S.R.D., Aug. 21, 1958. Indeed, some have been declared lucky in that
they have not been indicted for second degree murder. State v. Pollard, Conn. S.R.D.,
Aug. 21, 1958; State v. Elliott, 21 Conn. Supp. 461, 159 A2d 180 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct.
1958).
102. The maximum penalty for manslaughter is fifteen years in prison. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53-13 (1958).
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isolation or deterrence of the wife was probably not its aim. And none of the
facts discussed indicate any particular need for rehabilitation. Secondary deter-
rence, however, may have been the objective of this sentence, to impress upon
others the gravity of taking a human life. Standing alone, this might call for a
severe minimum sentence. But the character of the deceased 103 and his treat-
ment of the institution of marriage may well have evoked society's sympathy
for the defendant, so that community condemnation would not require a severe
sanction. Thus the Division was faced with two competing goals. Because it
reduced the minimum sentence to only one-third of that permitted by statute,
it may be surmised that the lack of community condemnation and not the
need for secondary deterrence was the dominant sentencing aim in this case.
But here again the conclusion must be conjectural.
Too often, the Division's opinion lists only a minimum of factual information
and does not even impliedly relate this information to a relevant sentencing
objective. One such opinion, reprinted here in its entirety, states:
BY THE DIVISION. The defendant, age forty-one, pleaded guilty to
the crime of incest and on October 3, 1958, was sentenced to a term of
not less than three nor more than seven years in state prison.
At the time of sentence the defendant had the following prior criminal
record:
January 15, 1935-Hartford, Connecticut-robbery with violence-
committed to Connecticut Reformatory for five years and one day.
November 7, 1935-transferred to State Prison.
Counsel for the defendant have requested that the Adult Probation
Department be ordered to make a further presentence investigation for
the purpose of interviewing the defendant's wife. We can see no necessity
for this, and therefore the motion is denied.
In our opinion the sentence is proper and should stand.1
0 4
This opinion could have ccontained an analysis of other pertinent information
which was at the Division's disposal. The defendant's wife knew of the in-
cestuous father-daughter relationship for seven months before reporting it
to the police. The daughter, who was sixteen at the time of her father's
arrest, admitted that her father had -been "bothering her" for four years.
She expressed a fear of "what might happen to her whenever the accused is
103. The character of the victim and his conduct at the time of the offense are cun-
sidered. Children receive maximum protection. See State v. Tuscano, 21 Conn. Supp. 455,
158 A2d 598 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958) ; State v. Vibert, 21 Conn. Supp. 434, 158 A2d
596 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958). A child's complicity in a crime will not mitigate. See
State v. Nasiatka, Conn. S.R.D., Dec. 28, 1959; State v. Sotire, Conn. S.R.D., July -2.
1959; cf. State v. Major, Conn. S.1hD., July 25, 1958 (statutory rape of "promiscuous"
girl). In sex cases involving adults, a lack of resistance or a display of friendliness
on the part of the victim may mitigate. See State v. Guiles, 22 Conn. Supp. 42, 159 A2d
190 (Rev. Di,. Super. Ct 1959) (rape, eight to twelve reduced to five to twelve).
104. State v. Y. The name of this case is withheld because some of the material which
follows is taken from the Synopsis and is confidential.
Incest is punishable by a maximum of ten years in prison. Com. Gm. STAT. § 53-223
(1958).
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at liberty." A psychiatric diagnosis of the defendant described his condition
as "sexual delinquency in a passive-dependent, inadequate personality." The
state recommended a sentence of one to eight years and defense counsel urged
a suspended sentence. At the time of sentencing, the trial judge, who had
learned that the daughter would graduate from high school in 1960, set a
three-year minimum because "I want to get beyond 1960 if I can." In ad-
dition, he recognized that rehabilitation might require a substantial period
of parole under supervision, as evidenced by his desire for a "reasonably long
stretch between the minimum and the maximum." Had the Division's opinion
included this additional information, it would have at least implied that isolation
of the offender and rehabilitation are the relevant aims in this type of case.
As it stands, the decision proffers no guidelines for future decisions.
Even less helpful was the opinion in a case involving a first-offender who
had pleaded guilty to indecent assault.105 The statutory maximum sentence
for this offense is ten years ;106 the defendant received one to three. Other than
a statement that the defendant had no prior criminal record the opinion states
only the facts of the crime: the defendant had had "unnatural sex relations
with a fourteen-year-old mentally retarded 'boy on the average of once or tvice
a week. On each occasion the defendant gave the boy fifty cents." The opinion
then concludes: "We can discover nothing in the record of this case to warrant
any change in sentence. In our opinion the sentence is proper and should
stand."'1 °7 Consider the position of a trial judge faced with a sentencing de-
cision in a similar case. How will this opinion help him? Is the fact that the
defendant "gave the boy fifty cents" of any significance? Is a distinction to be
drawn between those who violently assault their victims and those who bribe
them? Does the victim's mentally-retarded condition enter into the decision ?108
Was the youth of the victim an aggravating factor ?100 More important, the
opinion does not indicate what goals the sentence was (lesigned to achieve. Was
the sentence intended to facilitate this offender's rehabilitation? If so, did
105. State v. Sotire, Conn. S.R.D., July 22, 1959.
106. CoNN. Ga. STAT. § 53-217 (1958).
107. State v. Sotire, supra note 105.
108. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-225 (1958) (carnal knowledge of or by a feeble-
minded person punishable by maximum of three years in prison).
109. Compare the Division's philosophy in dealing with sex crimes against children,
as expressed in State v. Vibert, 21 Conn. Supp. 434, 158 A2d 596 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct.
1958):
Furthermore, it should be noted that in crimes involving injury or risk of
injury to children, relatively more severe sentences may be justified where the
circumstances reasonably warrant it, for several reasons. There is need for pro-
tecting the young from their own indiscretions of this nature, who are not infre-
quently led into them by the enticements held out, or decoys contrived, for the
purpose by an offender. Furthermore, in this type of offense, convictions may not
follow .the earlier instances of the commission of them, and difficulty of proof is




the record contain evidence, such as a psychiatric study, indicating that the de-
signated period will be long enough to accomplish this purpose? °1o On the
other hand, was the sentence intended to isolate this offender from society ?11I
If so, the Division should have articulated its reasons for believing that the
one-year minimum was a sufficient deterrent. Or, perhaps the Division meant
to imply that community condennation and retribution were the dominant
aims." Assuming that this is true, the reader is still unable to determine
whether deterrence and rehabilitation have been relegated to a secondary
position merely because of the peculiar facts of this case or whether community
condemnation and retribution are deemed the dominant aims in all cases in-
volving "unnatural sex relations." The Division's failure, in most of its
opinions, to articulate the answers to questions such as these creates a major
limitation on its value as a forum for the development of uniform sentencing
principles.A
Response to the Sentence Review Division
As a result of the few sentence modifications made and the Diision's re-
luctance to articulate sentencing policies, the Division bas not aroused the
interest of bench, bar, and public. Originally, the legislature provided for
publication of the Division's opinions in the Connecticut Supplennt, presum-
ably maling them available to all lawyers and judges in the state." 4 But
the Connecticut judges interviewed have stated that, except when called upon
to serve on the Review Division, they read only those opinions reviewing
cases in which they were the trial judge.* The bench, in fact, tends to view
110. The rehabilitation of sex offenders is regarded by the Division as a very difficult
task. State v. Roberts, Conn. S.R.D., Mar. 6, 1959 ("quite doubtful if this defendant,
behavior can ever be corrected") ; State v. Mason, Conn. S.R.D., June 30, 1958 ("the not
infrequent recidivistic character of such offenders").
111. Isolation is frequently articulated as the primary aim in sex cases. State v. Bene-
dict, Conn. S.RD., Oct. 7, 1958; State v. Butler, Conn. S.R.D., June 30, 1958; State v.
LeBlanc, Conn. S.R.D., Sept. 11, 1958; State v. Owens, 21 Conn. Supp. 418, 1538 A.2d
867 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1958).
112. See State v. L. G. Daniels, Conn. S.1.D., Oct. 17, 1953 (incest--"vicious and
despicable"); State v. Pratt, Conn. S.1..D., Oct. 7, 1958 (incest-"revolting, vicious,
and inherently imro oral"); State v. Mille, Conn. S.R.D., Feb. 10, 1959 (rape--"inherent
wrong"); State v. Munson, Conn. S.R.D, Oct. 22, 1959 (indecent assault-"repulsive,
cruel, sadistic and perverted acts").
113. It should be noted -that approximately one-fourth of the appeals to the Review.:
Division came from offenders sentenced under Connecticut's narcotics laws which, until
1959, required a minimum five-year sentence for the illegal use, possession, or sale of nar-
cotics. Coxx. GE-. STAr. § 2103 (d) (Supp. 1955). Naturally all appeals against minimum
sentence were futile, and most were briefly disposed of. See, e.g., State v. Hodge, Conn.
S.RD., Oct. 17, 1958. Although the mandatory minimum for addicts has been abolished,
CoNN. Gax. STAT. § 19-265a, (Supp. 1959), it remains applicable to sellers, Cox.. G .
STAT. § 19-265 (Supp. 1959).
114. Come. Gm. StrA. § 51-196 (1958).
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the Division not as an affirmative policy-creating body, but only as a resraint
on palpably unreasonable sentencing decisions." 0 The Division has occasion-
ally indicated that the sentence imposed by the trial judge will be affirmed
so long as it meets a "reasonable judge" test,"16 a statement of little assistance
to a trial judge seeking a positive statement of principles for future applica-
tion. To compound this problem, the 1959 Session of the Connecticut Gen-
eral Assembly has removed the mandatory publication requirement. Instead,
it instructed the Recorder of Judicial Decisions to "select... for publication
such decisions as he deems will be useful as precedents or will serve the public
interest."" 7 Now, even those opinions which should be of interest to the
judiciary may 'be unavailable.
The Connecticut bar shares the judiciary's disinterest in the work of the
Division. Prosecutors and defense counsel alike have stated that they did
not read the opinions even when all were published.* The appearances of
defense counsel before the Division have 'been relatively few.118 They feel
that the practical value of such appearances is minimal, since the vast majority
of opinions affirm the sentence imposed.* State's Attorneys tend to view
their required appearances before the Division as an unnecessary burden.* Like
defense counsel, they feel that the Division's only function is to apply the
"reasonable judge" test and that the use of presentence reports by trial judges 'It'
reduces the likelihood that the Division will find many palpably unreasonable
sentences.* Thus it is not uncommon to find State's Attorneys offering little or
no comment at the review hearing.* This disinterested attitude has increased
the difficulty of realizing the potentialities of the Review Division. Considering
the present quality of Division opinions, greater scrutiny and criticism by the
bar of such sentencing principles as are proposed would contribute substantially
to the improvement of future opinions and, ultimately, to the improvement
of the sentencing process itself.
Since criminal sentencing and, indeed, the criminal process as a whole are
oriented toward effectuating community objectives, informed public criticism
115. This opinion is shared by the bar and is manifested in the repeated suggestion
that a more active use of the pardoning power would obviate the need for a Sentence
Review Division*
116. See, e.g., State v. Major, Conn. S.R.D., June 30, 1958 ("the *defendant ... has
not been dealt with in an improper or unreasonable manner"). Examples of deference
to the trial judge due to his view of demeanor evidence also suggest this criterion. Sce
notes 65-66 supra. Hall suggests that a sentence must be substantially erroneous to merit
modification. Hall, 776 n.74.
117. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-196 (Supp. '1959).
118. Only 55 of the 256 appellants whose cases have 'been adjudicated by the Review
Division have been represented by counsel. Counsel were present at 3 of the 15 sentence
reductions, at only 1 of the 7 increases. Tabulation from Sentence Review Division files.
119. Presentence reports are mandatory for all first offenders (except first degree
murderers) and for those whose most recent prior conviction is more than three years
before the instant crime. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-109 (Supp. 1959).
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is also essential.'" For example, if the Division's opinions, stressing the aim
of rehabilitation, revealed that certain types of offenders were being committed
to state prison only because better rehabilitative facilities did not exist, 2 1 the
public might urge the legislature to provide the needed facilities. Similarly, if
the public felt that the Division was not sufficiently emphasizing the deterrent
aim in certain types of offenses, it might prevail upon its representatives to
enact mandatory minimum penalties for these offenses.1 2 Before it can sug-
gest policy decisions, however, the public must be informed of the standards
proposed by the Division. The press is the logical source of such informatiun.
It should realize, therefore, that not only the results of a particular case must be
reported, but also the sentencing goals which formed the basis of the Divi-
sion's opinion.
To date, the most serious drawback to the Division's effectiveness has been
the idea that it's primary function is to prevent "horrible sentencing examples."
By seldom attempting to supply generally applicable sentencing criteria, the
Division has overlooked its most significant potentialities and has lost the
interest of other participants and decision-makers of the criminal process. Unless
it assumes the role of an affimfative policy-maker,tm ad hoc, instinctive decisions
will continue to impede development in the field of sentencing.
120. For a consideration of public review of earlier phases of the criminal process, see
generally Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of ustce, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
121. See State v. Delfichael, Conn. S.R.D., Aug. 1, 1958 ("the courts had no other
place to send [sex offenders] but to state prison") ; State v. Veysey, Conn. S.R.D., July
30, 1958 (sex offender sent to prison "in the absence of more effective remedial treatment
and facilities"); State v. O'Connor, 21 Conn. Supp. 474, 159 A.2d 185 (Rev. Div. Super.
Ct. 1958) (arsonist sent to prison, given "the benefit of such correctional and remedial
facilities as were available to the court"). See also the statement of a trial judge on sentenc-
ing day:
What is the court supposed to do, indulge in some clinical research? . [. 1f
we had an institution or had means by which this sort of thing could be observed
and treated without placing an individual like this behind bars, that is where he
belongs, but I don't think under what I see here that he should be permitted at
large simply because I have a few statements here which seem to indicate further
treatment may do some good.
Synopsis, State v. Sotire, Conn. S.R.D., July 22, 1959.
122. In a reverse situation, the Review Division, operating under a statute which
imposed a five year mandatory minimum sentence for both users and sellers of narcotics,
attempted to distinguish between classes of offenders by varying the maximum penalty
Compare State v. Perez, 21 Conn. Supp. 421, 158 A.2d 748 (Rev. Div. Super. Ct. 1953)
(sort-time user; five to ten reduced to five to seven), with State v. Heyward, Conn. S.R.D.,
Oct. 17, 1958 (seller, five to seven increased to five to ten). These opinions may have
influenced the abolition of the mandatory minimum for users in 1959, Co.Tx. Gmx. STAT.
§§ 19-265, 19-265a (Supp. 1959).
123. One immediate improvement in the Division's opinions can be made by increasing
the number of cross-citations which appear in the opinions. To date, the Division has
confined itself almost exclusively to citing cases which articulate the state's narcotics
policy and cases which hold that the panel cannot retry guilt. The Division has said that
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it compares cases. State v. Howard, Conn. S.R.D., May 1, 1958. It should begin to cite
these cases.
Interchange of information among the decision-makers in this area might also be
facilitated by adoption of a plan paralleling 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1958). Under this plan
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Errors could convene institutes for the purpose
of discussing "objectives, policies, standards, and criteria for sentencing." While judges
would form the nucleus of these institutes, they could invite, at their discretion, penologists,
members of the bar, the legislature, and behavioral scientists. For the comments of federal
judges on such a plan, see Federal Sentencing Procedures 25-42. The first institute con-
ducted under the federal act was a success. Sharp, The Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 23
FED. PRon. No. 4, p. 9 (Dec. 1959).
